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How lowCan Interest Rates Be Pushed?
the market interest rate adjusted for the ex-
pected rate ofinflation. Long-term interest
rates playa key role in influencing the
economy, and they probably playa more
significant role than short-term interest rates.
But, in this Weekly, we will (ocus on short-
term interest rates for two reasons. First, the
Federal Reserve's instruments ofmonetary -
control, the discount rate and open market
operations, havetheirmajorimpacton short-
term interest rates. The Federal Reserve has
Iittleornodirectimpacton long-term interest
rates, which are dependent primarilyon the
productivity ofcapital and long-run inflation
expectations, Second, it is easier to measure
real interest rates in the short-term market
than in the long-term market because short-
run inflation expectations are closely related
to the most recent actual inflation rate, while
long-run inflation expectations (over the next
five toten years) are notnecessarily related to
past inflation.
One reasonable measure ofthe real short-
term interest rate is-the difference between
the market interest rate and the inflation rate.
In Chart I, we compared the 3-month Trea-
sury bill rate and the inflation rate (measured
on a12-month basis). Since September 1982,
the Treasury bill rate has averaged close to 8
percent and the inflation rate 5% percent,
giving arisk-free real short-term interest rate
ofabout 2V, percent. This is down substan-
tially from the Treasury bill rate ofas recent
amonth as June 1982 when it was 12% per-
cent. Althattime, the inflation rate was about
6 percent and therefore the risk-free real
short-term interest rate was about 6% per-
cent. Indeed, in the 1% years through June
1982, the real Treasury bill rate had been
extraordinarilyhigh, in the 5-7 percent range,
and was amajorcause ofthe weakness in the
economy in 1981 and 1982.
Alternative views
Should, then, the Federal Reserve attempt to
push the real short-term interest rates down
Fed policy issues
The key policy issues now facing the Federal
Reserve are two: whether interest rates have
declined sufficiently to provide for asustain-
able recovery in real output, and whether the
recent surge in M1has been sufficiently large
to create concern about reigniting future
inflation. With respect to the second issue,
the unexpected collapse in the velocityofM1
in 1982 (some 5 percent below its originally
forecasted value) and, more recently, the
wave ofinterest rate deregulation has called
into question the usefulness ofM1 as aguide.
to policy, at least through the first halfof
1983. With M1, the Federal Reserve's
primarymonetary guideline temporarily
"outoforder", the majorfocus ofpolicymust
be directed toward the broader monetary
aggregates and/or interest rates. This Weekly
wiII focus on interest rates.
In evaluatingthe effect ofinterest rates on the
economy, one must consider not only the
market rate butthe real interest rate. This is
But in spite ofthe depressed state ofthe
economy, there were some encouraging
signs. These consisted largely ofthe sharp
drop in interest rates since the middleof1982
that subsequently spurred astrong recovery
in the two previously most depressed indus-
tries-housing and automobiles. The
economic forecasting fraternity is virtually
unanimous in expecting 1983 to be better
than 1982. What can the Federal Reserve
do to aid an economic recovery?
The U.S. economy is in the worst recession
in 40 years. Whilethe broadest economic
measure, real Gross National Product, hit its
low point for this recession in the first quarter
of 1982, there has been little sustained
recovery since then. As aresult ofthis
anemic economic performance the unem-
ployment rate rose throughout 1982 and
stood at 10.8 percent in December, the high-
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further to stimulate growth? There are two
approaches to answeringthis question. The
first is that, given the depths ofthe recession,
weshould allowreal interest rates to become
negative, that is, market interest rates should
be pushed belowthe inflation rate to en-
courage a recovery. Once theeconomy had
started to show a sustained recovery, the ap-
propriatepolicywould be to raise the interest
rate abovethe inflation rate toensurethatthe
growth in aggregate demand was notexces-
sive, that is, did not reignite inflation.
Experience indicates that this flexible ap-
proach to interest rates is particularly impor-
tant. In the 1974-75 recession, the Treasury
bill rate fell below the inflation rate and the
real interest rate was minus 2-3 percent. Fol-
lOWing the 1974-75 recession, however, the
Treasury-bill rate never rose above the infla-
tion rate, and the real interest rate was kept
closetozeroforfouryears (mid-1975 tomid-
1979) as the economy grew rapidly and
added 11 million peopletotheemployment
roles. (The reluctanceto raise the real interest
rate in this expansion period was probably
dueto the unemploymentrate, which re-
mained well above 6 percent.)
The alternative approach argues that we
cannot now let interest rates fall much below
current levels because governmentdeficits
are more dangerous than they were in
1974-75. The recent deficits require a higher
real interest rate to finance. In 1974-75,
government deficits were largely induced
by the business cycle. In that recession, the
decline in tax receipts increased the deficit,
while the subsequent economic expansion
increased receipts and reduced the deficit.
In 1982-83, the business cycle deficithas,
superimposed on it, a structural deficit that
will notdisappearwhen theeconomyand tax
receipts increase.
Role of deficits
To understand this consideration, it is useful
to reviewthehistoryofgovernmentspending
and structural deficits (Chart 2). The govern-
ment spending share ofGNPmoved gradu-
ally from about 17 percent to 21 percent
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between 1955 and 1979. From 1979-1983, it
rose from 21 percent to 25 percent. The most
recent rise is partlydue to the relatively
weak economy. However, even ifGNPgrew
strongly between nowand 1985 the spend-
ing share is expected to decline only mod-
estly. The reason is that in spite ofpublic
perceptions to the contrary, the Reagan
administration did notreduce the trend in
governmentspending; it only changed the
mixofspending. Thus, with the continued
rise in the ratio ofgovernment spending to
GNP, the cost to the economyoffinancing
government has continued to rise.
There areonlythree ways in which increased
governmentspending can be financed: first,
by highertax receipts; second, by the in,
creased issuance ofgovernment bonds,
which the publiccan be inducedto holdonly
with higher real interest rates; and third, by
printingmoney, which increasesthe inflation
rate. Cutting taxes without cuttinggovern-
mentspendingdoes notreducethe costofthe
government, itmerely redistributes itfrom
one source offinancing to another.
In the 1960 s, the rise in the trend ofgovern-
ment spending was financed by tax revenues
generated by a rapidly growing real econ-
omy. In the period from 1960-69, we had
the longest continuous period ofeconomic
expansion in ourhistory (real growth aver-
aged 4.3 percent per year) and this generated
tax receipts that financed the growth in
governmentspendingeven when tax rates
were reduced.
In the 1970s, the continued growth in gov-
ernment spending as a share ofGNPwas
financed by a higher inflation rate. Real GNP
did not grow very rapidly (averaging 2.9 per-
cent per year), but nominal income, because
ofinflation, grew at an average rate of 10
percent per year, which pushed most people
into highertax brackets. This form of"infla-
tion tax" financed the increased government
spending.
In the 1980sthe Reagan administration has
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While this analysis is rather speculative, one
thing is clear, further reductions in short-term
interest rates would require the Federal
Reserve to increase the rate ofgrowth ofthe
money supply. The San Francisco Bank's
money market model estimates that for every
1percent reduction in interest rates, M1 will
need to grow5percentfaster (atannual rates)
than itotherwise would have over the next
three months.
Ifthe financial markets interpret further
reductions in short-term interest rates as an
attempt by the Fed indirectly to print money
to finance the deficit, long-run inflation
expectations and long-term interest rates may
rise. Should policymakers decide that the
recession is suffiCiently severe to warrant
further reductions in short-term interest rates,
they should consider the effect itwould have
on the long-term bond markets. A rise in
long-term interest rates is asignal that the
financial markets perceive monetary policy
to be too easy.
Conclusion
This country has had no experience with
deficits ofthis size, and therefore, no clear
idea ofhowhigh real interestrates mustgoto
finance them. In the 1960s the Treasury bill
rate was approximately 1to 1h percent
above the inflation rate, which suggests that
areal interest rate of1-1 h percentwas neces-
sary to fi nance the much lowerdeficits that
accrued in those years without inflation
financing. The current real Treasury bill rate
of2h percent may be about as low as that
interestrate can go and still finance the much
larger deficits that are currently being pro-
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Deficits and savings
To focus moreclosely on the effects ofdeficits
on interest rates and financial markets, we
must look at deficits as ashare ofnet private
savings ofthe economy. Net private savings
equals gross private savings less depreciation
allowances to maintain the existing capital
stock. In the 1960s, the deficit averaged
about 10 percent ofnet private savings, leav-
ing 90 percentavailable for private use. In the
1970s, the deficits varied from year to year,
but averaged just over 20 percent ofnet pri-
vate savings. In 1982, deficits consumed 80
percent ofnet private savings.
Most analysts do notexpect things to change
significantly in the years ahead. In 1983, the
cash deficitwill consumebetween 70 and 90
percent ofnet savings. The range depends
upon whether the tax incentives for savings
substantially increase savings or not. By
1985, the deficit is notexpected to decline
significantly, but the economy is assumed to
grow rapidly, reducing the deficit's share of •
net private savings to between 60 and 70
percent.
creep" (and thus tax receipts as apercentage
ofGNP will stabilize around 20 flercent in
1984, down modestly from 20.5 percent in
1980). The Federal Reserve has cut the infla-
tion rate from over 10 percent in 1980 to 5
percent in 1982. Ifthese gains are not to be
reversed, the only method left offinancing
the continued rise in govemmentspending as
a share ofGNP is to increase the govemment
issuingofbonds. This is the primarysourceof
what has been calledthestructural deficits. In
the Reagan administration, it looks as ifthe
deficits will average close to 5 percent of
GNP, the highest in our history outside ofa
major war.SS"'O.LSl:lI:l
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Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 163,305 -1,137 6,124 3.9
loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 142,480 -1,076 6,544 4.8
Commercial and industrial 44,81~ - 907 3,124 7.5
Real estate 57,586 1 1,317 2.3
loans to individuals 23,973 - 44 288 1.2
Securities loans 2,597 - 154 515 24.7
U.S. Treasury securities* 7,395 - 9 1,550 26.5
Othersecurities" 13,430 - 52 - 1,970 - 12.8
Demand deposits - total# 41,153 -3,689 - 844 - 2.0
Demanddeposits - adjusted 28,951 -1,178 - 1,070 - 3.6
Savings deposits - total 53,395 3,577 22,247 71.4
Time deposfts,-total# 82,186 -2,638 - 7,714 - 8.6
Individuals, part. & corp. 72,656 -2,514 - 8,265 - 10.2
(largenegotiable CO's) 28,215 - 926 - 7,366 - 20.7
Weekly Averages
of Daily Figures
Member Bank Reserve Position
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency (-)
Borrowings
















-* Excludes trading account securities.
# Includes items not shown separately.
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